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Abstract 20 
 The sense of agency refers to the feeling of authorship that “I am the one who is 21 
controlling external events through my own action”. A distinction between explicit 22 
judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency has been proposed theoretically. 23 
However, there has not been sufficient experimental evidence to support this distinction. 24 
We have assessed separate explicit and implicit agency measures in the same population 25 
and investigated their relationships. Intentional binding task was employed as an 26 
implicit measure and self-other attribution task as an explicit measure, which are known 27 
to reflect clinical symptoms of disorders in the sense of agency. The results of the 28 
implicit measure and explicit measure were not correlated, suggesting dissociation of 29 
the explicit judgement of agency and the implicit feeling of agency. 30 
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1. Introduction 36 
 The sense of agency refers to the feeling of authorship that “I am the one who is 37 
controlling external events through my own action”. This sense is a central component 38 
of self-awareness (Gallagher, 2000), and its underlying neural mechanisms have been 39 
reported (David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008). Symptoms of psychiatric and neurological 40 
diseases can be explained as a disruption of the sense of agency; examples of such are 41 
schizophrenia, conversion disorder, anarchic hand syndrome, and anosognosia for one’s 42 
own hemiparesis (Kranick et al., 2013; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b). For 43 
example, delusion of control in schizophrenia is a passivity experience that “My action 44 
is being controlled by others”, which is an alteration in the sense of agency. These 45 
symptoms teach us that the sense of agency, a fallible process (Blakemore, Wolpert, & 46 
Frith, 2002), requires reliable and objective clinical indicators. Measures of agency have 47 
been invented and assessed to give a fundamental understanding of self-awareness 48 
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Nielsen, 1963). At the same time, these measures 49 
have served as objective indicators to assess the subjective symptoms of the diseases 50 
(Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001; Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod, & 51 
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Franck, 2003; Kranick et al., 2013; Maeda et al., 2013; Wolpe et al., 2014). 52 
 There have been two distinct ways in measuring the sense of agency — explicit and 53 
implicit. Explicit measures address the sense of agency by obtaining a direct report of 54 
how they attribute the effect of their action. In a pioneering experiment, participants 55 
were asked to draw a line on a piece of paper, and at the same time the experimenter 56 
gave manual visual feedback that was in concordance with or in discordance with their 57 
actual movements (Nielsen, 1963). This paradigm has been modified in various works 58 
to test the participant’s ability to distinguish the actions they have performed and the 59 
actions performed by others (Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al., 2008; Franck et al., 2001; 60 
Maeda et al., 2012). In the study by Franck and colleagues (Franck et al., 2001), 61 
participants were given visual feedback of a voluntary action as a virtual hand, which 62 
moved in concordance with or in discordance with their movements. They were asked 63 
later on if the feedback corresponded with their actual movement or not. Patients with 64 
delusion of control in schizophrenia gave more “yes” answers to this question than 65 
normal participants did, indicating a correlation of clinical passivity experiences with 66 
the experimental attribution of actions. 67 
 However, it has been pointed out that explicit measures of agency can be subject to 68 
response bias (Wegner, 2003), and the need for indirect markers of agency has been 69 
discussed. The “intentional binding” effect focusing on temporal attraction between the 70 
perceived time of actions and their effects is a widely used quantitative method (Ebert 71 
& Wegner, 2010). Participants perform a volitional button press at the timing of their 72 
own choosing. They judge the timing of their volitional button press on the basis of 73 
Libet’s clock method (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). The button press will be 74 
followed by an auditory tone 250ms later. This is considered the effect of the action. 75 
They also judge the timing of the tone. A compression of timing judgments in action 76 
and its effect (the “intentional binding” effect) is known in the case of volitional actions 77 
but not in the case of non-volitional actions, and thus this method has been regarded as 78 
an implicit way to measure the sense of agency (Ebert & Wegner, 2010). The intentional 79 
binding effect has also been observed to change in accordance with the passivity 80 
experiences in diseases (Haggard et al., 2003; Kranick et al., 2013; Wolpe et al., 2014), 81 
which can serve as a quantitative indicator. 82 
 So far, a two-step distinction in the formation of implicit and explicit sense agency has 83 
been proposed (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Voss, 84 
  4 
2013), complementary to the central monitoring theory (i.e. “comparator model”) (C. D. 85 
Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). In the central monitoring theory, the sensory 86 
consequence of our action is predicted based on internal signals such as efference copy 87 
of the motor command. Comparison of the prediction with sensory afference will enable 88 
us to distinguish self-produced sensory information from externally caused events. 89 
Congruency of the predicted with sensory afference will lead to an interpretation that 90 
the action has been caused by our self, while incongruency will lead to an interpretation 91 
that the action has been caused externally. The sense of agency is explained in the final 92 
stage of action execution by a single mechanism in this framework. Recent studies 93 
pointed out that the sense of agency is not only based on internal signals but also 94 
modulated by various context cues (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner, & 95 
Haggard, 2009; Takahata et al., 2012; Voss et al., 2010; Wegner, 2003). These 96 
observations have led to arguments that the sense of agency holds a more complex 97 
structure, with multiple levels involving different processes (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; C. 98 
Frith, 2012; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2008a; Synofzik et al., 2013). The 99 
presence of problematic cases of the central monitoring theory in explaining the sense 100 
of agency both in healthy subjects and in patients with passivity experiences has also 101 
been pointed out (Synofzik et al., 2008a). Accordingly, a two-step distinction is 102 
proposed between the level of the “feeling of agency” and the “judgement of agency” 103 
(Synofzik et al., 2008a). The first-level feeling of agency is the non-conceptual, 104 
low-level feeling of being an agent. It refers to the implicit aspect of agency, which is 105 
closely related to action regulation or perceptual processing. The second-level 106 
judgement of agency is the conceptual, interpretative judgement of being an agent of an 107 
action. It refers to the explicit judgement of self-other attribution, which is closely 108 
related to background beliefs or context cues (Synofzik et al., 2008a). However, few 109 
experimental studies have approached the relationship between these two aspects of the 110 
sense of agency (Barlas & Obhi, 2014; Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Ebert & Wegner, 111 
2010; Moore, Middleton, Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012).  112 
 Recently, some efforts have been made to investigate both explicit and implicit 113 
measures of agency in a single task (Ebert & Wegner, 2010). However, the majority of 114 
previous experimental studies of psychiatric and neurological diseases assessed either 115 
explicit or implicit measures of agency (David et al., 2008), and they reported mixed 116 
results (e.g. exaggerated or decreased sense of agency in schizophrenia) (Voss et al 117 
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2010, Maeda et al 2013). Comparison of the traditional tasks that have frequently been 118 
used for clinical cases will facilitate the interpretation of the results of clinical studies 119 
from the perspective of the structures of the tasks. Thus, we separately assessed both 120 
explicit and implicit agency measures in the same population and investigated their 121 
relationships.  122 
 123 
2. Materials and Methods 124 
2.1. Participants 125 
 Twenty-five subjects (thirteen female, mean age = 64.9 years, SD = 2.9 years) 126 
participated in the study. Participants with known neurological or psychiatric history 127 
were excluded from the study. All the participants were right-handed according to the 128 
Edinburg Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Participants underwent two experiments. The 129 
implicit task was conducted first and the explicit task next, in order to keep the 130 
participants naïve to the study purpose. Written informed consent was obtained from 131 
each participant. Participants were paid for their participation. This study was approved 132 
by the ethics committee of Kyoto University Graduate School and Faculty of Medicine. 133 
 134 
2.2. Procedures and analysis 135 
2.2.1. Experiment 1- Implicit task  136 
2.2.1.1. Procedures 137 
 The sequence of events from a previous study (Haggard et al., 2002), known as 138 
intentional binding task, was employed. The task consisted of four conditions: (1) 139 
agency action, (2) agency tone, (3) baseline action and (4) baseline tone. In each 140 
condition, a blank screen was first presented, followed by a picture of a clock face and 141 
clock hand. The clock-hand was 12 mm long, which rotated clockwise for a full rotation 142 
in 2560 ms. The clock face was marked with 12 conventional interval positions (5,10,15, 143 
etc.). Initial positions of the clock-hand were chosen randomly from the 12 positions of 144 
the clock. The clock-hand remained stationary at the initial position for 500 ms, and 145 
then began to rotate. Procedures during the clock-hand rotation were as follows. In the 146 
agency action and agency tone conditions, participants performed a voluntary action. 147 
Participants performed a key press at a time of their own choosing during the 148 
clock-hand rotation. They were instructed to avoid responding at a pre-decided clock 149 
position, or during the first half-rotation of the clock hand. Each key press triggered a 150 
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tone after a fixed period of 250 ms. In the agency action condition, participants were 151 
asked to report the perceived onset time of their voluntary key press as judged by the 152 
perceived position of the clock hand. Similarly in the agency tone condition, 153 
participants were asked to report the perceived onset time of the triggered tone. In the 154 
baseline action condition, participants performed a voluntary key press at the time of 155 
their own choosing, but it did not yield a tone. Participants reported the perceived onset 156 
time of the voluntary key press. In the baseline tone condition, participants did not press 157 
a key but instead waited for a tone to be delivered, judging the onset time at which they 158 
heard the tone. Before running the experiment, participants performed a practice session. 159 
Each category of conditions was tested in separate blocks, in pseudo-randomized order 160 
consisting of 24 trials. Missed trials were repeated. After completing the task with one 161 
hand, participants conducted the task with the other hand. The order of right and left 162 
hand was counterbalanced across participants. All stimuli were displayed using 163 
Superlab 4.5 software.  164 
 165 
2.2.1.2. Data analysis 166 
 For the implicit task (experiment 1), the perceived time of action or tone in each trial 167 
was compared with the actual onset time, and a mean temporal estimation was 168 
calculated for each block. The mean estimation for actions and tones in the baseline 169 
condition was subtracted from that in the agency condition. Subtracting these baseline 170 
estimates allowed us to calculate the shift in the perceived time of the tone when caused 171 
by the action. These shifts served as measures of action binding and tone binding, 172 
respectively. These subtracted measures correspond to the perceived linkage between 173 
action and effect, and larger values indicate stronger perceived linkage. Finally, overall 174 
binding was defined as action binding minus tone binding. The bindings of the two 175 
hands were compared by paired t-tests. 176 
 177 
2.2.2. Experiment 2- Explicit task 178 
2.2.2.1. Procedures 179 
 A simplified task from a previous study (Franck et al., 2001) was employed. 180 
Participants were asked to hold a joystick that was connected to a computer. A black 181 
cover covered the joystick so that the participants could not see their actual movement. 182 
Instead, an image of an electronically constructed virtual hand was presented to the 183 
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participants on a computer screen as a feedback during the procedure. Participants were 184 
instructed that “their hand” would appear on the computer screen. A specially designed 185 
program synthesized images of a virtual hand holding a joystick and the virtual hand 186 
moved according to the position that was actually held by the participants. The 187 
movement of the joystick was presented dynamically on the screen with an intrinsic 188 
delay of 16ms.  189 
 In each trial, an image of a virtual hand was presented for 10 seconds after a blank 190 
screen, during which time participants were asked to move the joystick according to 191 
their own choosing. The movement could be executed in four directions (right, left, 192 
back, and forth). Immediately after the virtual hand disappeared, participants were 193 
asked a yes-or-no question as follows: “Did the movement you saw on the screen 194 
correspond to the movement you made with your hand?” 195 
 The task consisted of three categories of conditions: (1) neutral, (2) with angular biases, 196 
and (3) with temporal biases. In the neutral condition, the virtual hand moved exactly 197 
according to the movements the participants made with the joystick. In the angular 198 
biases condition, a given angular value (5°, 10°, 15°, and 20°) was introduced as a gap 199 
between the movements of the virtual hand and the joystick. In the temporal biases 200 
condition, a given time delay (50, 100, 150, 200, 300, 400, and 500 ms) was introduced 201 
as a gap between the movements of the virtual hand and the joystick. 202 
 Trials with angular biases and trials with temporal biases were run four times for each 203 
type of gap. Neutral trials were run 12 times. The order of presentation of all trials was 204 
randomized for each subject. Before running the experiment, participants performed a 205 
practice session. Missed trials were repeated. After completing the task with one hand, 206 
participants conducted the task with the other hand. The order of right and left hand was 207 
counterbalanced across participants.  208 
 209 
2.2.2.2. Data analysis 210 
 For the explicit task (experiment 2), there could potentially be two types of errors: “yes” 211 
responses for trials with a bias, and “no” responses for neutral trials. For data analysis, 212 
“yes” responses were focused upon, reflecting the participants’ ability to recognize the 213 
movement as their own. “Yes” responses of the two hands were examined by repeated 214 
measures ANOVA with event (each bias) and hand (right versus left), for angular and 215 
temporal gaps separately. The data were converted into a 0-1 estimate (0 for “no” and 1 216 
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for “yes” responses), to fit into a logistic regression model of Y=1/(1 + exp(-(a+bX))). 217 
The slope coefficient (b) was calculated for each subject, as these slopes provide 218 
estimates about how strictly a subject would draw an explicit judgement of agency. The 219 
50% threshold (-a/b) for the total data was also calculated. 220 
 Lastly, correlations between the results of the implicit task and the explicit task were 221 
explored by Spearman’s rank correlation analysis. A p-value of less than 0.05 was 222 
considered significant in all analyses. 223 
 224 
3. Results 225 
3.1. Implicit task 226 
 The perceived time of actions of the baseline condition was -176.5 (SD: 106.8) ms in 227 
the right-hand trials, and -187.0 (SD: 96.0) ms in the left-hand trials. The perceived time 228 
of tones in the baseline condition was -50.6 (SD: 61.5) ms. There was a positive shift in 229 
the perceived time of actions in the agency condition compared to the baseline condition 230 
(action binding) [right: 64.2 (SD: 119.4) ms, p=0.013; left: 78.3 (SD: 117.7) ms, 231 
p=0.003]. At the same time, there was a negative shift in the perceived time of tones in 232 
the agency condition compared to baseline condition (tone binding) [right: -113.1 (SD: 233 
155.5) ms, p=0.001; left: -114.5 (SD: 171.3) ms, p=0.003]. These results indicate that 234 
actions were perceived later when they were followed by tones, and tones produced by 235 
voluntary actions were perceived earlier than baseline tones. Overall binding was 236 
calculated as action binding minus tone binding [right: 177.3 (SD: 218.3) ms; left: 192.8 237 
(SD: 214.1) ms]. 238 
 Action binding, tone binding and overall binding between the right and left hand were 239 
highly correlated [action binding: r=0.877, p=0.000; tone binding: r=0.902, p=0.000; 240 
overall binding: r=0.908, p=0.000], and did not show significant difference in paired 241 
t-tests [action: t(24)=1.195, p=0.244; tone: t(24)=0.093, p=0.927; overall: t(24)=0.762, 242 
p=0.453] (Figure 1). The averaged data of the right and left hand for each participant 243 
were focused in the following correlation analyses. The averaged action binding was 244 
71.2 (SD = 114.9) ms, tone binding was -113.8 (SD = 159.3) ms, and overall binding 245 
was 185.1 (SD = 224.4) ms. 246 
 247 
3.2. Explicit task 248 
 Repeated measures ANOVA with angular bias (0°, 5°, 10°, 15°, and 20°) and hand 249 
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(right and left) revealed a main effect of angular bias (F(2.9,70.8)=72,17, p=0.000), no 250 
angular bias × hand interaction (F(1.7,41.9)=1.47, p=0.24), and no main effect of hand 251 
(F(1,24)=1.37, p=0.25). Similarly, repeated measures ANOVA with temporal bias (0, 50, 252 
100, 150, 200, 300, 400, and 500 ms) and hand (right and left) revealed a main effect of 253 
temporal bias (F(3.2,76.8)=92.60, p=0.000), no temporal bias × hand interaction 254 
(F(4.3,103.0)=1.19, p=0.319), and no main effect of hand (F(1,24)=1.34, p=0.259). 255 
These results indicate that the participants’ attribution of the movement was affected by 256 
angular biases and by temporal biases, but not by their handedness (Figure 2).  257 
 Next, the data as a 0-1 estimate (0 for “no” and 1 for “yes” responses) were fit into a 258 
logistic regression model of Y=1/(1 + exp(-(a+bX))). The data of the right and left hand 259 
were included together in the following analysis. The slope coefficient (b) was 260 
calculated for each subject. The average slope coefficient (b) for each participant was 261 
-1.10 (SD = 1.75) for angular biases condition, and -0.022 (SD = 0.014) for temporal 262 
biases condition. The 50% threshold (-a/b) for the total data was revealed to be 9.5° for 263 
the angular biases condition and 170.9 ms for the temporal biases condition. For this 264 
reason, “yes” responses in the 5° and 10° for the angular biases, and 150ms and 200ms 265 
for the temporal biases were focused upon in the following correlation analyses. The 266 
average percentage of “yes” responses was 75.5% (SD = 27.4) for 5° angular bias, 267 
46.0% (SD = 35.1) for 10° angular bias, 52.0% (SD = 35.8) for 150ms temporal bias, 268 
and 38.0% (SD = 31.3) for 200ms temporal bias. 269 
 270 
3.3. Relationship between implicit and explicit task 271 
 The measures in the implicit task (action binding, tone binding and overall binding) 272 
were compared with each of the slope coefficients (b) in the explicit task. Then the 273 
measures in the implicit task were also compared with the numbers of “yes” responses 274 
around the 50% threshold in the explicit task. There was no significant correlation 275 
between bindings in the implicit task and the measures in the explicit task (Table 1). 276 
 277 
4. Discussion 278 
 In this study we have assessed two distinct methods of measuring the sense of agency 279 
and investigated their relationships. We employed methods that are widely recognized 280 
as being in accordance with clinical symptoms of the disorders in the sense of agency: 281 
“intentional binding” task as an implicit measure and self-other attribution task as an 282 
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explicit measure. We found a discrepancy between implicit intentional binding and 283 
explicit self-other attribution. 284 
 In the intentional binding task (experiment 1), participants experienced actions as 285 
shifted towards their subsequent effects, while effects were perceived as shifted towards 286 
the preceding action. This was compatible with previous findings and can be regarded 287 
as a bias to intensify the causal relationship between action and its consequence 288 
(Haggard et al., 2002). In the explicit self-other attribution task (experiment 2), 289 
participants gave most attribution of the feedback to themselves when the movement 290 
had not deviated from their actual movement, and this tendency decreased as the 291 
angular bias and temporal bias became more obvious. At the same time, this means that 292 
the distorted sensory feedbacks could be attributed to their own movement even in cases 293 
of certain discrepancies, with continuous recalibration. This observation does not 294 
strictly fit the central monitoring theory in terms of recognizing self as a match and 295 
non-self as a mismatch. Additionally, individual differences in these implicit and 296 
explicit measures did not correlate, suggesting that these two aspects in the sense of 297 
agency do not consist of a single process.  298 
 Theoretical works have proposed a distinction between implicit and explicit sense of 299 
agency processing systems, owing to the presence of problematic cases of the central 300 
monitoring theory in explaining the sense of agency both in healthy subjects and in 301 
patients with disorders of the sense of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008a; Synofzik et al., 302 
2013). It has been argued that not of all the predicted sensory signals generated from 303 
our own movements will reach awareness (Castiello, Paulignan, & Jeannerod, 1991; 304 
Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998), and thus small discrepancies do not necessarily influence 305 
the sense of agency. The importance of emotional valence (Takahata et al., 2012) and 306 
beliefs as external contextual cues have also been emphasized (Synofzik et al., 2013). 307 
Other studies have shown that central monitoring in patients with schizophrenia is 308 
unimpaired when making predictions for the sensorimotor adjustments for grip force 309 
(Delevoye-Turrell, Giersch, & Danion, 2002), or when adjusting hand movements in 310 
case of discrepancies between their own hand movements and visual consequences 311 
(Fourneret, Franck, Slachevsky, & Jeannerod, 2001; Knoblich, Stottmeister, & Kircher, 312 
2004). However, these findings do not deny the importance of sensorimotor prediction 313 
and the sensory feedback in the formation of the sense of agency. Recent theories have 314 
proposed an integration of various cues in two forms of agency, as an extension of the 315 
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central monitoring theory (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013). Although 316 
presented theoretically, only a few experiments have been conducted to support the 317 
distinction of implicit and explicit sense of agency (Barlas & Obhi, 2014; Dewey & 318 
Knoblich, 2014; Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Moore et al., 2012).  319 
 This issue was approached in a single experiment by assessing the effect of 320 
action-effect consistency on implicit agency and self-reported authorship (Ebert & 321 
Wegner, 2010). Action-effect consistency was defined according to whether the object 322 
on the screen moved in the same, or in the opposite direction as the action. Implicit 323 
agency was measured on a 10-point scale as interval estimates of how much time has 324 
passed from the participants’ own movement to the intended movement on the screen. 325 
Explicit agency was measured on a 7-point scale in terms of how much the participants 326 
felt that their movement made the object on the screen move. It has been shown that 327 
action-effect consistency affected explicit self-reported authorship more than implicit 328 
interval estimates. Additionally, implicit interval estimates and explicit authorship were 329 
correlated when asked in the same block, while they did not correlate when asked in 330 
separate blocks. This points out the problems of arbitral linkage of the interval estimates 331 
on self-reports when asked simultaneously. A study explored the association of 332 
intentional binding and explicit prediction using a dissociation paradigm of implicit and 333 
explicit learning (Moore et al., 2012). In their experiment, outcomes were 334 
probabilistically caused by actions. Participants conducted the intentional binding task, 335 
and at the same time they judged the extent to which they believed there would be a 336 
tone in the next trial. The learning history of action binding showed a different pattern 337 
from that of the explicit prediction. These preceding experiments have approached the 338 
issue by introducing an explicit question into implicit agency measures. In our study we 339 
assessed the intentional binding task as implicit measure and self-other attribution task 340 
as explicit measure, and we compared the two measures when both were assessed as 341 
individual tasks. The possibility of the previous question affecting the later ones was 342 
avoided by assessing this in separate experiments. Our findings add the notion that the 343 
two systems are separable, in line with individual differences, fitting the theoretical 344 
framework as proposed by Synofzik et al. (2008a).  345 
 An alternative explanation that could be offered from our results is that this difference 346 
is due to the different structures of the two tasks. There are ongoing discussions on the 347 
backgrounds of both implicit and explicit measures. For example, there are studies 348 
  12 
suggesting that causation but not intentional action is the root of intentional binding 349 
(Buehner, 2012; Dogge, Schaap, Custers, Wegner, & Aarts, 2012). Also, the explicit 350 
task has been discussed in terms of contamination by an aspect of the sense of 351 
ownership of body movement instead of evaluating the sense of agency alone (Tsakiris, 352 
Longo, & Haggard, 2010). Owing to these limitations, there are possibilities that our 353 
results derive from different structural backgrounds including different validity as an 354 
agency task. At the same time, our results indicated that cautious interpretations would 355 
be needed to evaluate the sense of agency in clinical cases by single measure. 356 
 Another limitation of our study is that the intentional binding effect observed in our 357 
study was relatively large compared to the original study (Haggard et al., 2002). 358 
However, reported amounts of binding in healthy subjects are not constant among 359 
studies, and indeed there are works that report rather strong binding in healthy subjects 360 
(Kranick et al., 2013; Takahata et al., 2012). Possible causes of this difference can be 361 
the forms of button press as voluntary actions, or volumes and pitches of the tones as 362 
feedbacks of actions, which are not being controlled among studies. The result of the 363 
explicit task is also relatively different from the original study (Franck et al., 2001), 364 
under-attributed in angular condition and over-attributed in delay condition. Possible 365 
causes for this difference can also arise from the difference in experimental setups. 366 
Compared to Franck’s original study, which used a horizontal mirror to present the 367 
visual feedback, we modified the apparatus and placed the computer screen directly in 368 
front of the participants. The intrinsic delay of the feedback, and the time span of the 369 
virtual image appearance are also different. Regardless of these differences, the 370 
essentials of the evaluations have been preserved. 371 
 In summary, by comparing the two distinct methods of measuring the sense of agency, 372 
we found supporting evidence for the dissociation of the explicit judgement of agency 373 
from the lower-level experience of the feeling of agency. We suggest that a distinction 374 
between these two aspects will be essential in evaluating the sense of agency in health 375 
and in diseases. 376 
 377 
Acknowledgements 378 
 This work was supported by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research A (24243061), and 379 
on Innovative Areas (23120009), from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 380 
Science and Technology of Japan (MEXT); Grants-in-Aid for Young Scientists A 381 
  13 
(23680045) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science - Japan (JSPS); Health 382 
and Labour Science Research Grant for Comprehensive Research on Disability Health 383 
and Welfare (H25-seishin-jitsuyouka-ippan-001) from the Ministry of Health, Labour 384 
and Welfare - Japan.  385 
 The authors wish to extend their gratitude to Takashi Tsukiura and Paeksoon Park for 386 
coordination of the study, Shikiho Dote for data acquisition, Satoshi Saito for technical 387 
support, and most of all, to the participants in the study. 388 
 389 
Conflict of interest 390 
 The authors report no conflict of interest associated with this manuscript. 391 
 392 
References 393 
Barlas, Z., & Obhi, S. S. (2014). Cultural background influences implicit but not 394 
explicit sense of agency for the production of musical tones. Consciousness and 395 
Cognition, 28, 94-103. 396 
Blakemore, S. J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness 397 
of action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 237-242. 398 
Buehner, M. J. (2012). Understanding the past, predicting the future: causation, not 399 
intentional action, is the root of temporal binding. Psychological Science, 23, 400 
1490-1497. 401 
Castiello, U., Paulignan, Y., & Jeannerod, M. (1991). Temporal dissociation of motor 402 
responses and subjective awareness. A study in normal subjects. Brain, 114, 2639-2655. 403 
Daprati, E., Franck, N., Georgieff, N., Proust, J., Pacherie, E., Dalery, J., et al. (1997). 404 
Looking for the agent: an investigation into consciousness of action and 405 
self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients. Cognition, 65, 71-86. 406 
David, N., Newen, A., & Vogeley, K. (2008). The "sense of agency" and its underlying 407 
cognitive and neural mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 523-534. 408 
Delevoye-Turrell, Y., Giersch, A., & Danion, J. M. (2002). A deficit in the adjustment of 409 
grip force responses in schizophrenia. Neuroreport, 13, 1537-1539. 410 
Dewey, J. A., & Knoblich, G. (2014). Do implicit and explicit measures of the sense of 411 
agency measure the same thing? PLoS One, 9, e110118. 412 
Dogge, M., Schaap, M., Custers, R., Wegner, D. M., & Aarts, H. (2012). When moving 413 
without volition: implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary 414 
  14 
actions and effects. Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 501-6. 415 
Ebert, J. P., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). Time warp: authorship shapes the perceived 416 
timing of actions and events. Consciousness and Cognition, 19, 481-489. 417 
Farrer, C., Frey, S. H., Van Horn, J. D., Tunik, E., Turk, D., Inati, S., et al. (2008). The 418 
angular gyrus computes action awareness representations. Cerebral Cortex, 18, 419 
254-261. 420 
Fletcher, P. C., & Frith, C. D. (2009). Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to 421 
explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10, 422 
48-58. 423 
Fourneret, P., Franck, N., Slachevsky, A., & Jeannerod, M. (2001). Self-monitoring in 424 
schizophrenia revisited. Neuroreport, 12, 1203-1208. 425 
Fourneret, P., & Jeannerod, M. (1998). Limited conscious monitoring of motor 426 
performance in normal subjects. Neuropsychologia, 36, 1133-1140. 427 
Franck, N., Farrer, C., Georgieff, N., Marie-Cardine, M., Dalery, J., d'Amato, T., et al. 428 
(2001). Defective recognition of one's own actions in patients with schizophrenia. The 429 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 454-459. 430 
Frith, C. (2012). Explaining delusions of control: the comparator model 20 years on. 431 
Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 52-54. 432 
Frith, C. D., Blakemore, S. J., & Wolpert, D. M. (2000). Abnormalities in the awareness 433 
and control of action. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series 434 
B, Biological Sciences, 355, 1771-1788. 435 
Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive 436 
science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 14-21. 437 
Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and cofnscious 438 
awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 382-385. 439 
Haggard, P., Martin, F., Taylor-Clarke, M., Jeannerod, M., & Franck, N. (2003). 440 
Awareness of action in schizophrenia. Neuroreport, 14, 1081-1085. 441 
Knoblich, G., Stottmeister, F., & Kircher, T. (2004). Self-monitoring in patients with 442 
schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 34, 1561-1569. 443 
Kranick, S. M., Moore, J. W., Yusuf, N., Martinez, V. T., LaFaver, K., Edwards, M. J., et 444 
al. (2013). Action-effect binding is decreased in motor conversion disorder: implications 445 
for sense of agency. Movement Disorders, 28, 1110-1116. 446 
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious 447 
  15 
intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The 448 
unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 106, 623-642. 449 
Maeda, T., Kato, M., Muramatsu, T., Iwashita, S., Mimura, M., & Kashima, H. (2012). 450 
Aberrant sense of agency in patients with schizophrenia: forward and backward 451 
over-attribution of temporal causality during intentional action. Psychiatry Research, 452 
198, 1-6. 453 
Maeda, T., Takahata, K., Muramatsu, T., Okimura, T., Koreki, A., Iwashita, S., et al. 454 
(2013). Reduced sense of agency in chronic schizophrenia with predominant negative 455 
symptoms. Psychiatry Research, 209, 386-392. 456 
Moore, J., & Haggard, P. (2008). Awareness of action: Inference and prediction. 457 
Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 136-144. 458 
Moore, J. W., & Fletcher, P. C. (2012). Sense of agency in health and disease: a review 459 
of cue integration approaches. Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 59-68. 460 
Moore, J. W., Middleton, D., Haggard, P., & Fletcher, P. C. (2012). Exploring implicit 461 
and explicit aspects of sense of agency. Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 1748-1753. 462 
Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., & Haggard, P. (2009). Modulating the sense of agency 463 
with external cues. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 1056-1064. 464 
Nielsen, T. I. (1963). Volition: a new experimental approach. Scandinavian Journal of 465 
Psychology, 4, 225-230. 466 
Oldfield, R. C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: the Edinburgh 467 
inventory. Neuropsychologia, 9, 97-113. 468 
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008a). Beyond the comparator model: a 469 
multifactorial two-step account of agency. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 219-239. 470 
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Newen, A. (2008b). I move, therefore I am: a new 471 
theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership. Consciousness and 472 
Cognition, 17, 411-424. 473 
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., & Voss, M. (2013). The experience of agency: an interplay 474 
between prediction and postdiction. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 127. 475 
Takahata, K., Takahashi, H., Maeda, T., Umeda, S., Suhara, T., Mimura, M., et al. 476 
(2012). It's not my fault: postdictive modulation of intentional binding by monetary 477 
gains and losses. PLoS One, 7, e53421. 478 
Tsakiris, M., Longo, M. R., & Haggard, P. (2010). Having a body versus moving your 479 
body: neural signatures of agency and body-ownership. Neuropsychologia, 48, 480 
  16 
2740-2749. 481 
Voss, M., Moore, J., Hauser, M., Gallinat, J., Heinz, A., & Haggard, P. (2010). Altered 482 
awareness of action in schizophrenia: a specific deficit in predicting action 483 
consequences. Brain, 133, 3104-3112. 484 
Wegner, D. M. (2003). The mind's best trick: how we experience conscious will. Trends 485 
in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 65-69. 486 
Wolpe, N., Moore, J. W., Rae, C. L., Rittman, T., Altena, E., Haggard, P., et al. (2014). 487 
The medial frontal-prefrontal network for altered awareness and control of action in 488 
corticobasal syndrome. Brain, 137, 208-220. 489 
490 
  17 
Figure captions 491 
Figure 1 492 
Perceived times of actions and tones in experiment 1. Actions were perceived as shifted 493 
toward their subsequent tones, while tones were perceived as shifted towards the 494 
preceding action that caused them.  495 
 496 
Figure 2 497 
Number of “Yes” responses when participants were asked whether movements on the 498 
screen corresponded to their own computer movements in experiment 2. (A) with 499 
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Table 1 503 
Correlations between scores of implicit task and explicit task 504 
 
 Implicit task 
 Action binding  Tone binding Overall binding 
Explicit task    
Slope coefficient    
  Angular biases 0.217 0.196 0.013 
  Temporal biases 0.064 -0.139 0.174 
      
Number of yes responses    
  5° angular bias 0.039 0.128 -0.089 
  10° angular bias 0.201 0.120 0.021 
  150ms temporal bias -0.032 -0.315 0.181 
  200ms temporal bias 0.003 -0.281 0.200 
Spearman rank correlations. None showed significant (p< 0.05) correlations. 
 505 
